Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive p o wer of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the So a school (notably, George Gargov, Valentin Goranko, Solomon Passy and Tinko Tinchev), the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.
Introduction
Arthur Prior proposed using modal languages for temporal reasoning more than 40 years ago, and since then the approach has become widespread in a variety of disciplines. Over this period, a wide range of (often very powerful) modalities has been used to reason about time. This is unsurprising. After all, di erent choices of temporal ontology (such as instants, intervals, and events) are relevant for di erent purposes, and (depending on the application) considerable expressive p o wer may be needed to cope with the way information can be distributed across such structures. But inventing new modalities is not the only way o f boosting modal expressivity. There is a largely overlooked alternative enough to de ne the Until operator). Second, in stark contrast to ML+8 which has an elegant axiomatization, axiomatizing ML + # seems to require complex proof rules.
What are we to do? Here we show t h a t introducing an operator @ w h i c h retrieves the value stored by # solves these problems: it o ers the expressivity we n e e d , the minimal logic is elegant, and we automatically get completeness results for a wide class of interesting frame classes, many of which are not modally de nable. All this without sacri cing locality. 2 These results are the technical core of the paper, but to close our discussion we change gears | there is an important conceptual point to be made about hybridization and its relevance to temporal logic: hybridization is not simply about quantifying over states. Rather, hybridization is about handling di erent types of information in a uniform way. We illustrate this idea by discussing a simple hybrid language for quantifying over paths.
But we are jumping ahead. There is much t o b e d o n e b e f o r e w e can usefully discuss such ideas, so let's call a halt to our introductory remarks and start developing the idea of hybridization systematically.
The basic modal language
One of the simplest languages for temporal reasoning is the propositional modal language that contains just two modalities: an operator 2 (read as: at all future states) together with its dual operator 3 (read as: at some future state). For most of this paper we will be working with various hybrid extension of this simple language (which we will call ML). The purpose of the present section is to x notation and terminology, to remind the reader of various standard concepts (in particular, generated submodels and bisimulations), and to present a wish-list of properties for hybrid temporal languages.
Given a (countable) set of propositional symbols PROP = fp q r : : : g the well-formed formulas of ML are de ned as follows:
WFF := p j : ' j '^ j 2':
Other Boolean operators (_, !, $, ?, >, and so on) are de ned in the usual way, and we de ne 3' to be :2:'.
ML is interpreted on models. A m o d e l M is a triple (S R V ) such t h a t S is a non-empty set of states, and R is a binary relation on S (the temporal precedence relation) the pair (S R) is called the frame underlying M. The valuation V is a function with domain PROP and range Pow(S) this tells us at which states (if any) each propositional symbol is true. Depending on the application, additional properties may be demanded of R: in temporal logic (various combinations of) such properties as transitivity, irre exivity, density, discreteness, trichotomy, no-branching-to-the-right, and many others, are common. We shall deal with such demands later. Note the locality of the satisfaction de nition: formulas are evaluated inside models at some particular state (called the current state), and the 2 and 3 operators scan the states accessible from the current state via the precedence relation R. This locality i n tuition is arguably the central intuition underlying modal approaches to temporal logic it is certainly the intuition which prompted Arthur Prior to pioneer the \modal logic of time" (which he called tense logic). As he observed, we are situated inside the temporal ow, and many aspects of language (for example, the use of tense, and temporal indexicals such a s now) re ect this internal perspective. Accordingly, h e b e l i e v ed that modal analyses of temporal logic were like l y t o b e m o s t r e v ealing. 3 The locality o f M L h a s a n o b vious mathematical consequence: satisfaction of ML formulas is preserved under the formation of generated submodels. To b e more precise, given a model M = ( S R V ) and a state s of S, the submodel of M that is generated by s contains just those states of M that are accessible from s by a nite number of transitions along R. It follows by an easy induction that for all formulas ': M s j = ' i M s s j = ': In what follows, we use preservation under generated submodels as a key criterion for judging hybrid temporal languages. We are interested in local temporal languages, and will reject hybrid extensions which lead to a loss of the generated submodel preservation results. Now for a key question: does ML have the expressivity needed for temporal reasoning? There is no absolute answer: it depends on the application. For some applications, ML will often be too strong. For example, if one is interested in using modal languages to characterize various types of bisimulation invariance, it may b e n e c e s s a r y t o w ork with sublanguages of ML containing no propositional symbols (w s would be built using the constant ?) or to shed some Boolean expressivity.
But for many other applications, ML is too weak. 4 For a start, as has already been mentioned, no formula of ML is capable of distinguishing irre exive from re exive states in all models this means that a fundamental constraint o n temporal precedence simply isn't re ected. Moreover, consider the de nition of 3 The best introduction to Prior's views is Prior (1967) . 4 A very obvious weakness is that ML o ers us no way of looking backwards along R for that we need Prior's language of tense logic. However, while useful in natural language semantics, in many applications in AI and theoretical computer science, backward looking operators don't play a prominent role. Apart from occasional remarks we w on't discuss tense logic here, but Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a) , the extended version of the present paper, contains a full treatment. This is an extremely natural local operator (note that formulas built using Until are preserved under the formation of generated submodels) and has proved a useful tool for temporal reasoning in computer science (indeed, computer scientists usually regard Until as the fundamental modality). However the Until operator is not de nable in ML. As the non-de nability o f b o t h Until and irre exivity follows from the fact that ML formulas are preserved under bisimulations, a n d as we will later make use of special bisimulations called quasi-injective bisimulations, it will be useful to prove these non-de nability results here.
A bisimulation between two m o d e l s M 1 = ( S 1 R 1 V 1 ) a n d Thus, ML has expressive w eaknesses that are relevant to temporal reasoning, and one of the key goals of this paper will be to repair them by h ybridization. But what should a hybrid temporal language look like? It is time to draw u p a wish-list.
First, we w ould like our hybrid language to be local. Second, we w ould like our hybrid language to be expressive enough to detect irre exivity a n d de ne Until. Third, we w ould like t o n d h ybrid languages in which the central ideas of modal and classical proof systems can be clearly combined. Indeed, we w ould like to exhibit a synergy between modal and classical ideas we w ant the whole, so to speak, to o er more than the sum of its parts. Let's now examine the two hybrid binders that have previously been studied and see how they measure up against these demands.
Two hybrid binders
Syntactically, h ybridizing ML involves making two c hanges. First, we sort the atomic symbols instead of having just one kind of atom (namely the symbols in PROP) we add a second sort called state symbols. For reasons we shall soon explain, it is convenient t o divide state symbols into two subcategories: state variables and nominals. Second, we add binders. The binders will be used to bind state variables, but not nominals or propositional symbols. Let PROP be as described before. Assume we have denumerably in nite set SVAR of state variables (whose elements we t ypically write as u, v, w, x, y and z), and a denumerably in nite set NOM of nominals (whose elements we typically write as i, j, k and l). We assume that PROP, S V AR and NOM are pairwise disjoint. We call SVAR NOM the set of state symbols, a n d P R OP SVAR NOM the set of atoms. Choose B to be one of 8 or #. We build the well-formed formulas of the hybrid language (over PROP, S V AR, NOM, and B)
as follows:
Here a 2 ATOM, and x 2 SVAR. If B was chosen to be 8, we obtain the language ML + 8, and if B was # we get ML + #. (Strictly speaking, di erent choices of PROP, S V AR and NOM give rise to di erent languages, but we ignore this whenever possible.) A full discussion of the syntax of these languages would need to de ne such concepts as`free',`bound',`substitutable for', and so on. But experience with classical logic is a reliable guide, and anyway the relevant de nitions may be found in Blackburn and Tzakova (1998), so we'll simply remark that a sentence is a formula containing no free variables or nominals, and that we use the notation ' s=v] to denote the formula obtained by substituting the state symbol s for all free occurrences of the state variable v in '.
As promised in the introduction, our hybrid languages use formulas as labels: in the semantics presented below, both state variables and nominals will be satis ed at exactly one state in any model. Now, the role of the state variables should be clear but what is the point of having nominals? Simply this: it is convenient to have a supply of labels that cannot be bound by the binders this simpli es some of the technicalities, for it saves us having to worry about accidental binding. In short, nominals are reminiscent of the`parameters' used in classical proof theory. Now for the semantics. The key idea is straightforward: we are going to insist that state symbols are interpreted by singleton subsets of models. We'll also need a smooth way to handle the fact that state variables may become bound, whereas this is not possible for nominals or propositional symbols. But there is an obvious way t o d o t h i s : we'll let the state variables be handled by a separate assignment function in the manner familiar from classical logic.
De nition 1 (Standard models and assignments) Let L be a hybrid language over PROP, SVAR and NOM. A m o del M for L is a triple (S R V ) such that S is a non-empty set, R a binary relation on S, a n d V : P R OP NOM ;! Pow(S). A model is called standard i for all nominals i 2 NOM, V (i) is a singleton subset of S.
An assignment for L on M is a mapping g : S V AR ;! Pow(S '. a This concludes the preliminaries it's time to take a closer look at the binders.
The 8 binder
The 8 binder is the stronger, more classical, of our binders: indeed it's just the familiar universal quanti er in a modal setting. Note that if we de ne 9x' to be the dual binder :8x:', then:
ML + 8 is a powerful language. We saw in the introduction that it can distinguish irre exive from re exive states. Moreover it can de ne the Until operator:
Until(' ) := 9y(3(y^')^2(3y ! )):
This de nition says: it is possible to bind the variable y to a successor state in such a way that (1) ' holds at the state labeled y, and (2) holds at all successors of the current state that precede this y-labeled state. In addition, the minimal temporal logic of ML + 8 has a simple axiomatization that can be proved complete reasonably straightforwardly. All in all, it's a lovely language.
But there's a snag: it isn't local. To see that satisfaction of ML+8 sentences need not be preserved under the formation of generated submodels, consider the following counterexample (taken from Blackburn and Seligman (1995) If you want a strong hybrid language and are not interested in maintaining locality, t h e n M L + 8 is probably an excellent c hoice. Indeed, you may w i s h t o consider working with a hybrid language even less local, namely ML + 8 enriched with the universal modality A. 5 The universal modality h a s t h e f o l l o wing satisfaction de nition: M s j = A' i M s 0 j = ' for all states s 0 2 M. It is not hard to see that adding the universal modality yields a hybrid language with rst-order expressive p o wer (Prior knew this result, and formulated it in a n umberof ways). Moreover, the A and 8 work together extremely smoothly, making elegant axiomatizations possible (see Bull (1970) ). But while such r i c h systems are interesting, they are far removed from the local temporal languages we w i s h t o d e v elop.
The # binder
If one is interested in local hybrid languages, the # binder is the most natural starting point. Quite simply, # binds a variable to the current state it creates a label for the here-and-now. Let's look at it more closely. 6 First, note that # is self-dual that is, at any state, in any standard model, under any standard assignment, #x' is satis ed if and only if :#x:' is satis ed too. To put it another way, we are free to regard # as either a \universal quanti er over the current state" or as an \existential quanti er over the current state" as there is exactly one current state, these amount to the same thing.
Next, note that #x' is de nable in ML+8 w e can de ne it either as 8x(x ! ') o r 9x(x^'), thus ML + # is a fragment o f M L + 8. It's quite an interesting 5 Virtually the entire literature on hybrid languages is devoted to such systems. For example, both Bull (1970) and Passy and Tinchev (1991) make u s e o f 8 and A. 6 Incidentally, while # is a relative n e w comer to hybrid languages (Goranko (1994) seems to be the rst published account) essentially the same binder has been introduced to a number of di erent n o n -h ybrid languages for a wide variety of purposes see for example Richards et al (1989) , Cresswell (1990) , and Sellink (1994) . Labeling the here-and-now s e e m s t o b e a n important operation. fragment. For a start, sentences of ML+# are preserved under the formation of generated submodels. (We leave the simple proof to the reader. Essentially it boilsdown to the observation that the only states that # c a n b i n d t o v ariables in the course of evaluation must be states in the generated submodel. For example, in the previous diagram, if we e v aluate a sentence at s, the only state that we can bind to any variable is s itself ML+# cannot detect t, which is what we want.) Moreover, adding the # binder boosts the expressive power of ML in temporally interesting ways. In particular, note that the sentence #x2:x is true in a model at a state s i s is irre exive.
Unfortunately, ML + # has two d r a wbacks. First, there is no obvious way to provide a complete axiomatization without resorting to a fairly complex rule of proof. 7 Second, for many purposes it simply isn't expressive enough. Let's examine this second problem more closely.
Although adding # increases the expressive power, Until still isn't de nable. To s e e w h y, we m a k e use of the quasi-injective bisimulations introduced We can use this result to show that no sentence of ML + # de nes the Until operator. To b e m o r e s p e c i c , l e t p and q be propositional symbols. Then, even over strictly partially ordered models, there is no sentence ' U(p q) of ML + # 7 Blackburn and Tzakova (1997) axiomatize the set of valid ML + # by making use of the COV rule (see Gargov, Passy and Tinchev (1987) , Passy and Tinchev (1991), Gargov a n d Goranko (1993) ). Unfortunately, t h e COV rule is rather complex: it employs arbitrarily deep nestings of modalities.
The only other work on axiomatic systems for #, we know of are Goranko (1994) and Goranko (1996a) . However Goranko's investigations have little bearing on the concerns of the present paper, for Goranko i n vestigates a language containing both the universal modality and #. Note that the 8 binder is de nable in this language by 8x' := #yA#xA(y ! '), thus Goranko's language has full rst-order expressive p o wer.
that is satis ed in a model M a t a s t a t e s i Until(p q) is satis ed in M at s.
To see this consider the following two models:
Until(p q) ( In both models, the relation we are interested in is the transitive closure of the relation indicated by t h e a r r o ws, thus both models are strict partial orders.)
Note that Until(p q) is false in the left-hand model at the root node, and true in the right-hand model at the root. Hence if some sentence ' U(p q) of ML + # expressed Until(p q), it would be false at the root of the left-hand model, and true at the root of the right-hand side one. But this is impossible, for the obvious unraveling' relation between the two models is a quasi-injective bisimulation.
Summing up, previously studied hybrid systems don't meet our three wishlist criteria. The 8 binder is interesting and elegant | but to adopt it is to abandon locality. The # binder is far more promising | binding to the current state is such a n i n trinsically modal idea that it deserves further attention. But can we o vercome its expressive w eakness? And are there natural ways to avoid dependence on complex rules of proof? The answer is \Yes". As we shall now show, we can do this by adding a retrieval operator @ to match the action of # for two further solutions, consult the extended version of this paper. 4 The @ operator Suppose we were given a brand new web-browser to test, and we discovered it had the following limitation: although it allowed us to bookmark URLs, it didn't allow us to jump to these locations by c l i c king on the stored bookmark. Frankly, w e w ouldn't dream of working with such a b r o wser we'd demand that this shortcoming be xed right a way.
ML+# is rather like this (hopefully non-existent) browser: 3 pushes us through cyberspace, and # allows us to label the states we visit on our travels | but ML+# doesn't o er us a general mechanism for jumping to the states we label. Let's put this right. We shall allow ourselves to construct formulas of the form @ s '. To e v aluate such a formula we will jump to the state s labels and see whether ' holds there in e ect, @ will enable us to use the values # has so carefully stored for us.
Let's make this precise. If s is a state symbol and ' is a formula then @ s ' is a formula. It is possible to think of @ as a binary modality whose rst argument is a state symbol and whose second argument is a formula | but as will soon become clear, it is more natural to view the composite symbol @ s as a unary modal operator. If we add all these state-symbol-indexed unary modalities to ML+#, w e obtain ML+#+@. Most syntactic aspects of ML+#+@ are obvious, though the following point i s w orth stressing: @ d o e s not bind variables. Only the # binder does that. Now for the semantics. Let M = ( S R V ) be a standard model, let g be a standard assignment o n M, and let Den(s) be the denotation of the state symbol s (that is, Den(s) is g(s) if s is a state variable, and V (s) if s is a nominal).
Then:
As promised, @ s jumps to the denotation of s and evaluates its argument t h e r e .
Sentences of ML+#+@ are preserved under generated submodels. After all, in a sentence, the only occurrences of @ will be of the form @ y , where y is a state variable bound by some occurrence of #, and as # binds locally, the result follows. Second, @ can de ne Until. 8 As we have already seen, Until is not de nable in ML+#, but it certainly is in ML+#+@:
Until(' ) := #x3#y@ x (3(y^')^2(3y ! )):
Note how t h i s w orks: we label the current state with x, use 3 to move t o a n accessible state, which we label y, and then use @ to jump us back t o x. We then use the modalities to insist that (1) ' holds at the state labeled y, and (2) holds at all successors of the current state that precede this y-labeled state. Note the similarities (and di erences) with our earlier 9-based de nition of Until. 9 As this example shows, # and @ make a great team they communicate smoothly and their cooperation gives rise to an axiomatization called H # @](K).
This axiomatization is an extension of the minimal modal logic K. Recall that K is the smallest set of formulas containing all propositional tautologies, and all instances of 2(' ! ) ! (2' ! 2 ), that is closed under modus ponens (if ' and ' ! are both provable, then so is ) a n d necessitation (if ' is provable then so is 2'). To the axioms and rules of proof of K we add axioms and rules governing both # and @. Let's deal with # rst. First, we h a ve all instances of the following schemas: 10 8 A lot more could be said about @, and we can't say it all here. But two things should be said. First, the reader has almost certainly seen something like @ in non-hybrid languages: for example it's Prior's T(s ') construct in third g r ade tense logic, it's the Holds(s ') operator introduced by Allen (1984) for temporal representation in AI, and it is the characteristic operator of the Topological Logic of Rescher and Urquhart (1971) . Note that the @ operator supports a variety of natural interpretations: for example, computationally it can be viewed as a goto instruction.
But one perspective is particularly relevant here: @ can be viewed a s a r estricted version of the universal modality. First, note that @s' can be de ned as either A(s ! ') o r E(s^'), where E is the dual if A. In short, @ allows limited access to the power of A, and the limitation results in a generated submodel for sentences. But as we shall see below, @ has enough power to support elegant proof theories. 9 Note that the prenex block #x3#y@x de nes an existential quanti er over states reachable in 1 R-step: # 1 y ' := #x3#y@x' this binder is discussed in detail in the extended version of the paper. Similarly, w e can de ne an existential quanti er over states accessible in 2 Rsteps: # 2 y ' := #x33#y@x'. Indeed, for any natural numbern we can de ne an existential quanti er over states accessible in n R -steps. Note that we also have simple de nitions of the universal quanti ers over states reachable in n R -steps: for example, + 2 y ' := #x22#y@x'.
It is easy to see that # n and + n are dual binders, for any natural numbern. 10 These axioms were used as part of the COV -based axiomatization of Blackburn and Tzakova (1998) . In Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a) , the extended version of the present paper, these axioms are discussed further, and analogs of Q1{Q3 are given for the + 1 binder mentioned in the previous footnote. Q1 and Q2 are obvious analogs of familiar rst-order axiom schemas. The major di erence is that the present v ersion of Q2 only lets us substitute state symbols for binders when the obvious locality condition is ful lled: s must be true in the current state. This restriction motivates the introduction of Q3, which allows us to eliminate bound occurrences of state variables in antecedent position. In addition to these axioms we h a ve t h e rule of state variable localization that is, if ' is provable then so #x'. Summing up: # supports a local form of classical reasoning. But in spite of the locality restriction, the axioms just introduced are strong enough to support many classical principles such a s -conversion. As an illustration (for full details, see the extended version) we show:
Lemma 4 (Normality) For all formulas ' and we have:
Proof. Note that #x(' ! ) ! (x ! (' ! )) is an instance of Q2, a s i s #x' ! (x ! '). Hence`(#x(' ! )# x')) ! (x ! ). Use localization to pre x this formula with #x, and then Q1 to distribute #x over the main implication to get`(#x(' ! )# x') ! #x(x ! ). Note that #x(x ! ) ! # x is an instance of Q3, s o w e can simplify the consequent and so obtain the result. (Using Q3 in this way to simplify the conditionals produced by applications of Q2 is typical of H # @](K) proofs.) a Let's turn to @. For every state symbols, w e h a ve the rule of @ s -necessitation (if ' is provable then so is @ s '). In addition we have the rules Paste-0 and Paste-1 these will be introduced below. In addition, we h a ve all instances of the following schemas. These fall naturally into three groups. The rst identi es the basic logic of @. And (apart from the Paste rules) that's H # @](K). We l e a ve the soundness proof to the reader, and turn straight to the issue of completeness. Essentially we're going to adapt the modal canonical model method to our new language (we assume the usual notions of consistency, Maximal Consistent Sets (MCSs) and so on see the extended version for further details). We begin by proving a key lemma without the help of the yet-to-be-introduced Paste rules. Let us say that an MCS is labeled if and only if it contains a state symbol if a state symbol belongs to an MCS we c a l l i t a label for that MCS. . a This lemma gives us a lot | in essence it says that the subscripted @ operators in any labeled MCS index a well-behaved collection of labeled MCSs. Now, thinking ahead to the Truth Lemma we w i l l h a ve t o p r o ve, it should be clear why we want to work with labeled MCSs: with the help of Q2, we can use these labels to instantiate state variables bound by #, and hence establish the inductive step for #. Thus the s are plausible model-building material nonetheless, they don't yet have all the properties we w ant.
First there's a small wrinkle: we w ould like the MCSs we use to be labeled by a nominal, n o t j u s t a f r e e v ariable this isn't crucial, but it saves having to worry about about accidental binding. But note that even if ; itself contains a nominal (say i), we h a ve no guarantee that all the s do too: for example, ; may contain @ x :j for all nominals j, in which case x won't contain any nominals at all, though of course it will contain x.
And there's a second, far more serious, problem. Suppose we t a k e the collection of s yielded by a labeled MCS as the building blocks of our model. Doing this means we h a ve t h r o wn away MCSs we w i l l b e w orking in a submodel of the canonical model. How d o w e k n o w t h a t a m o d a l s t yle Existence Lemma holds for this submodel? That is, how can prove the clause of the Truth Lemma for the modalities? Bluntly, there is no obvious way to do this.
The Paste rules enable us to x both problems. Here they are:
The rule on the left is called Paste-0, the rule on the right Paste-1. In both, t mu s t b e a s t a t e s y m bol distinct from s that does not occur in ' or .
The key rule is Paste-1. Read contrapositively (that is, read from bottom to top) it tells is that pasting a brand new state symbol under the scope of 3 is a consistency preserving operation | for if we can't derive a contradiction (that is, ) without the new nominal, then we can't derive the contradiction after we h a ve pasted. We shall leave the reader to ponder the simpler Paste-0 rule (essentially it says that giving a brand new name to a labeled state isn't going to cause any problems) and prove the Extended Lindenbaum's Lemma we need. 11 De nition 7 (Pasted MCSs) An MCS ; is 0-pasted i @ s ' 2 ; implies that for some nominal i, @ s (i^') 2 ;. It is 1-pasted i @ s 3' 2 ; implies that for some nominal i, @ s 3(i^') 2 ;. We say that ; is pasted i it is both 0-pasted and 1-pasted. For suppose not. Then for some conjunction of formulas from we have that`j ! : as j is from the new-nominal enumeration, it does not occur in . Let P be a proof of`j ! : and let x be any state variable that does not appear in this proof. Then replacing every occurrence of j in P by x yields a proof of`x ! : . Localization then yields# x(x ! : ). By Q3, # x: . Now v acuous occurrences of the # binder are eliminable in H # @](K) (for: ' ! : ', so for any v ariable x not occurring in ', localization and Q1 yield: ' ! # x:', whereupon contraposition and the self duality o f # yield the result). Hence`: , which contradicts the consistency of . Thus j is consistent after all.
We n o w paste. Enumerate all the formulas of L + , de ne 0 to be j , a n d suppose we h a ve de ned m , where m 0. Let ' m+1 be the m+1-th formula in 11 The extended version of this paper discusses the admissibility of these rules. A s e m a n tic argument is given which strongly suggests that Paste-0 isn't a genuine enrichment of the system, though at the time of writing this hadn't been backed up by a s y n tactic proof. The admissibility o f Paste-1 is posed as an open problem.
But while interesting, to focus exclusively on the admissibility o f Paste-1 over an axiomatic basis is to miss the true signi cance of this rule: Paste-1 is actually the most natural part of H # @](K) | it's the other components that should be eliminated! This is the strategy adopted in Blackburn and Seligman (1998) . Drawing on ideas from Seligman (1997) an @-based sequent system is presented and the idea underlying Paste-1 nds its true home.
Incidentally, Paste-1 is closely related to a rule introduced by G a b b a y and Hodkinson (1990) for Until-Since logic. The Gabbay and Hodkinson method is discussed in detail in the extended version of the paper, and Paste-1 is introduced as, so to speak, an @-based implementation of their idea that bypasses the need to work with arbitrary sequences of tense operators. n . It is clear that this set is labeled by a nominal, maximal, and 1-pasted. Furthermore, it must be consistent, for the only non-trivial aspects of the expansion are those de ned by items 2 and 3, and Paste-0 and Paste-1 respectively guarantee that these are consistency preserving.
So it only remains to check that is 0-pasted because of the rather limited way item 2 uses Paste-0 this may not be entirely obvious. First, note that by basic modal reasoning`@ s ^@ s ! @ s ( ^ ). So suppose @ s ' 2 . If s is a nominal, say i, then because @ i i is an axiom, @ i (i^') 2 as required. On the other hand, if s is a variable, say x, then because of the pasting process carried out in item 2, for some nominal i we h a ve t h a t @ x (i^x) 2 . As @ s is a normal modal operator, @ x i 2 , so @ x (i^') 2 . We conclude that is the required L + -MCS. a
We're now ready to prove the completeness of H # @](K) | in fact we h a ve everything we need to prove the completeness of many of its extensions as well.
De nition 9 (Labeled models and natural assignments) Let ; be a p asted MCS labeled by a nominal. For all state symbols s, let s be f' j @ s ' 2 ;g, and de ne S to be f s j s is a state symbolg. Then we de ne M, the labeled model yielded by ;, to be (S R V ), where R and V are the restrictions of R c (the canonical relation) and V c (the canonical valuation) to S. We de ne the natural assignment g : SVAR ;! S b y g(x) = fs 2 S j x 2 sg.
Such labeled models have all the structure we w ant. For a start, by Clause 3 of Lemma 6, ; 2 S, and by Clause 5, V is a standard valuation and g is a standard assignment. Further, all states in the model contain nominals (because ; is 0-pasted), and hence are well-behaved as far as # is concerned. Moreover, we know from Lemma 6 that M is extremely well-behaved with respect to @. So it only remains to ensure that such models are well-behaved with respect to the modalities that is, we w ant an Existence Lemma. This, of course, is where 1-pasting comes in:
Lemma 10 (Existence Lemma) Let M = (S R V ) be the labeled model yielded by a pasted set ; that is labeled by some nominal. Suppose 2 S and 3' 2 . Then there i s a 2 M such that R and ' 2 . Proof. As 2 S, for some nominal i we h a ve that = i hence as 3' 2 , @ i 3' 2 ;. But ; is pasted (and hence 1-pasted) so for some nominal k, @ i 3(k^') 2 ;, and so 3(k^') 2 i . If we could show that (1) i R k , and (2) ' 2 k , then k would be a suitable choice of . And in fact Bridge and Back, aided by the @-agreement p r o p e r t y of our model (that is, item 2 of Lemma 6) will let us establish this.
For (1), we need to show that for any 2 k , w e h a ve t h a t 3 2 i . So suppose 2 k . This means that @ k 2 ;. By @-agreement, @ k 2 i . But 3k 2 i . Hence, by Bridge, 3 2 i as required.
For (2) Proof. T h e r s t i s p r o ved in the expected way: given a H # @](K)-consistent s e t of formulas , use the Extended Lindenbaum Lemma to expand it to a pasted set + labeled by some nominal in a countable language L + . By the Truth Lemma just proved, the labeled model and natural assignment t h a t + gives rise to satisfy at + . This model need not be connected, but the submodel generated by + is, and all sentences in + are true in this submodel. a But there's no need to stop here | one of the nicest things about hybrid languages is the ease with which general completeness results for richer logics can be proved. 12 Moreover, such results typically link completeness and framede nability in a very straightforward way.
A formula is said to de ne some property of frames (for example, transitivity) i it is valid on precisely the frames with that property (recall from Section 2 that a formula is valid on a frame i it is impossible to falsify it at any state in that frame, no matter which v aluation or assignment is used). The sort of results we are after have roughly the following form: for any f o r m ula ' from some speci ed syntactic class, if ' de nes a property P, then using it as an additional axiom guarantees completeness with respect to the class of frames with property P. For ordinary modal languages, the Sahlqvist Theorems are the best known result of this type (see Sahlqvist (1975) ) as we shall see, analogous results for hybrid languages come far more easily. We shall give t wo. The idea underlying both is the same: stop thinking in terms of propositional variables, and start thinking in terms of state symbols.
We s a y that a formula of ML+#+@ is pure i it contains no propositional variables our rst result concerns pure sentences. As the following examples show, pure sentences are remarkably expressive each s e n tence de nes the property listed to its right. All these properties are relevant to temporal reasoning, and (with the exception of transitivity and density) none are de nable in ordinary modal logic: The last three expressions can be simpli ed using + n notation. 13 Let us say t h a t a pure sentential axiomatic extension of H # @](K) i s a n y system obtained by adding as axioms a set of pure sentences of ML+#+@.
Theorem 13 (Extended Completeness I) Let Pure be a set of pure sentences of ML+#+@, and let P be the pure sentential axiomatic extension of H # @](K) obtained by adding all sentences in Pure as axioms. Then every P-consistent set of formulas in a countable language L is satis able in a countable standard m o del, based o n a f r ame that validates every axiom in Pure, with respect to a standard assignment function. Moreover, every consistent set of sentences in L is satis able in a countable connected standard model based on a f r ame that validates Pure. Proof. An easy corollary of Theorem 12: given a P-consistent set of formulas , build a satisfying model by expanding to a set + in a countable language L + , and forming the labeled model M = ( S R V ) and the natural assignment g. Now, the labeled model is built of MCSs, and each axiom in Pure belongs to every P-MCS, thus by the Truth Lemma, M g j = Pure. But as Pure contains only sentences, t h e c hoice of assignment i s irrelevant, hence M j = Pure. Moreover, as Pure contains only pure sentences, the choice of valuation is also irrelevant, and (S R) j = Pure. This proves the rst claim. Finally, i f c o n tains only sentences, we obtain a connected model by restricting our attention to the submodel generated by + the underlying subframe validates Pure. a
As a simple application, note that we obtain the logic of strictly partially ordered frames (which many writers, for example van Benthem (1983), would regard as the minimal temporal logic) by adding as axioms #x2:x and + 2 y 3y the previous theorem guarantees that the labeled model validates these axioms, hence as they de ne irre exivity and transitivity respectively, the labeled model will have these properties. This is pleasant, but let's push things further. Theorem 13 requires us to use sentences as axioms. However it can be more natural to use pure s c h e m a s .
Consider, for example, the schema 33s ! 3s. Any instance of this schema de nes transitivity, and it is easy to verify that including all instances as axioms guarantees a transitive labeled model. Similarly, a n y instance of the schema 3s^3t ! 3(s^3t) _ 3(s^t) _ 3(t^3s)]
de nes the no-branching-to-the-right property, and including all instances as axioms guarantees a labeled model with this property. Both transitivity and no-branching-to-the-right a r e de nable using pure sentences, 14 but the use of schemas can o er more. A simple example is the schema 3s any instance of this de nes the class of frames (S R) s u c h that R = S S, and its inclusion as an axiom schema imposes this property on labeled models. 15 A pure schematic extension of H # @](K) i s a n y system obtained by adding all ML+#+@ instances of a set of pure schemas of ML+#+@ as axioms to H # @](K). Theorem 14 (Extended Completeness II) Let Schemas be a set of pure schemas of ML+#+@, and let S be the pure schematic extension of H # @](K) obtained by adding all instances of the schemas in Schemas as axioms. Then every S-consistent set of sentences in a countable language L is satis able in a countable standard model, based on a frame that validates all these axioms, with respect to a standard assignment function. Moreover, every consistent set of sentences in L is satis able in a countable connected standard model based on a frame that validates all these axioms.
Proof. See the extended version of this paper. a 14 The pure sentence + 1 y + 1 z (3y^3z ! 3(y^3z) _ 3(y^z) _ 3(z^3y)]) de nes nobranching-to-the-right. 15 We don't know many temporally relevant examples in ML+#+@ that require the use of schemas, but examples are easy to nd in tense logic enriched with #. For example, the schema Ps _ s _ Fs guarantees trichotomy (that is, 8xy(xRy _ x = y _ yRx)), while P F s guarantees us left-directedness (that is, 8xy9z(zR x^zRy).
What sort of coverage do Theorems 13 and 14 o er? For a start, note that all our examples of frame properties de nable by p u r e sentences or (instances of) pure schemas were rst-order. This is no accident: a simple extension of the Standard Translation for the basic modal language shows that every pure formula of ML+#+@ de nes a rst-order condition on frames. The Standard Translation for the basic modal language is de ned as follows:
S T x (p) = P x for all propositional symbolsp S T x (:') = :S T x (') S T x ('^ ) = S T x (')^S T x (') S T x (2') = 8y(xRy ! S T y (')) (In the rst clause, P is a monadic second-order predicate variable each p r o p ositional symbol corresponds uniquely to such a s y m bol.) Following Blackburn and Seligman (1998), we extend this translation to ML+#+@ as follows: we assume that the rst-order variables we h a ve a vailable consist of all the usual state variables, plus a distinct variable x i for each nominal i and de ne:
S T x (y) = x = y for all state variables y S T x (i) = x = x i for all nominals i S T x (#x') = 9y(x = y^S T x (')) S T x (@ y ') = S T y (') Suppose ' is a formu l a o f M L + #+@ we suppose that ' has been -converted so that it contains no occurrences of the variable x (we reserve t h i s v ariable to denote the current state). It is easy to see that S T x (') will contain at least one free variable (namely x). It is also easy to see that this extended version of ST preserves satisfaction. That is for any M L + #+@ formula ', any standard model M = ( S R V ), any standard assignment g, and any s 2 S:
The notation on the right means: assign s to the free variable x, assign the unique element o f g(z) t o z if z occurs free in the translation, assign the unique element o f V (i) t o x i if x i occurs free in the translation, and assign V (p) t o P if P is a monadic predicate variable that occurs free in the translation. Now w e can see why i t pays to be pure: if ' contains no propositional variables, then the previous expression simpli es to
We a r e n o w rmly in the world of rst order logic. But let's carry on. We h a ve:
and hence:
(S R) j = ' i (S R) j = 8z 1 8 z n 8xST x ('):
On the righthand side we h a ve simply universally quanti ed over all the freevariables in 8xST x ('). In short, the frame property a n y p u r e f o r m ula de nes can be calculated by applying the standard translation and forming the universal closure. Thus Theorem 13 and 14 bear a certain family resemblance to the Sahlqvist Theorems: all these results cover rst-order properties which c a n b e e ectively calculated from the relevant axioms.
There are a host of related questions worth pursuing. For example, we h a ve seen many examples of rst-order properties which are not modally de nable but which are de nable using pure formulas can all modally de nable rst-order conditions be captured in this way? And if not, can all Sahlqvist de nable properties be so captured? 16 5 Working with other sorts Our technical work is done, but our conceptual work is not. The reader may h a ve gained the impression that hybridization is simply the business of quantifying over states in a modal setting. But while that's part of the story, and an important part too, we believe that a more general idea deserves to be made explicit.
Our preceding work rested on a simple idea: combining two forms of information in a uniform way. Our languages dealt with arbitrary information (via the propositional symbols) and labeling information (via the state symbols) and yet we drew no distinction between terms and formulas both types of information were handled propositionally. Now the natural question is: if this works for state-label information, why shouldn't it work for other types of information as well? For example, in some applications we might w ant t o w ork with intervals, or events, or paths, or some combination of these ent i t i e s | s o w h y n o t i n troduce special atomic symbols that label such e n tities and allow o u r s e l v es to bind them? In short, why not attempt hybridization in more ambitious ways? 17 Intriguingly, there are at least two w ays of doing this. The rst involves little change to the work of previous sections. For example, working with intervals in a modal logic standardly means working with richer frames, perhaps frames of the form (S < v). Here S is thought of as a set of intervals, < as the precedence relation on intervals, and v as the inclusion relation on intervals. 18 16 There are rst-order properties which are modally de nable but not Sahlqvist de nable, which can be de ned by pure sentences. For example, transitivity + atomicity ( 8x9y(xRy8 z(yRz! z = y))) is de nable by the conjunction of the modal transitivity axiom (33p ! 3p) and the McKinsey formula (23p ! 32p), but no Sahlqvist formula de nes this condition.
Incidentally, McKinsey does not de ne atomicity, and in fact, no ordinary modal formula does so only transitivity + atomicity is modally de nable. But the following pure sentence de nes atomicity: 3#y2y. W e h a ve already seen that transitivity is de nable by a pure sentence. 17 In suggesting this we are merely echoing Arthur Prior, for this idea was an important | perhaps the dominant | theme in his later work the key reference here is the posthumous Prior and Fine (1977) , which consists of draft chapters of a book, together with papers, and an invaluable appendix by Kit Fine which attempts to systematically reconstruct Prior's views. Prior attached immense philosophical weight to this project in his view it showed that that possible worlds were not needed to analyze modal notions and indeed, that times were not needed to analyze temporal expressions. Only (suitably sorted) propositions (and properties) mattered.
Prior's philosophical position is interesting: it is strongly information oriented, has natural a nities with frameworks such as Property Theory and Situation Semantics, and deserves further exploration. Nonetheless, here we prefer to adopt a neutral perspective on the philosophical signi cance of hybrid languages: for present purposes, they are simply an elegant t o o l for talking about structures locally, and adding further sorts is simply an interesting technical idea. 18 Various constraints would be imposed to make t h i s i n terpretation plausible. Typically we would demand that (S <) be a strict partial order, that (S v) be partial order, and that < Or perhaps we'd prefer working with frames bearing the 14 relations demanded in Allen (1984) . Either way, the fundamental point is that we are enriching our notion of what a state is by locating it in a r i c her web of relations. This mode of enrichment i s o b viously compatible with the methods discussed earlier for example, it is straightforward to work with Allen-style intervals using # and @. 19 Such an approach naturally leads to multi-sorted systems. For example, if we w anted to work with atomic interval structures, it would be natural to have a sort which labeled arbitrary intervals, and a subsort which labeled atomic intervals (see Blackburn (1992) ). But there is another way o f d e v eloping multi-sorted hybrid languages. This hinges on the following observation: some entities can be thought of as structured sets of states. For example, an interval is the set of all states between two end points. 20 Why not add atomic symbols that range over such sets? After all, we already have propositional symbols ranging over arbitrary subsets, and statesymbols ranging over singleton subsets | so why n o t s y m bols that range over convex sets too? This is arguably a useful idea (see Blackburn (1990 Blackburn ( ,1992 Blackburn ( ,1993 ) and it is certainly simple to handle logically. 21 But to illustrate the structuredset approach to sorting in more detail we want to discuss not intervals but paths, because this example not only provides a nice illustration of the potential of sorting for temporal logic, it also makes clear that even simple-looking extensions can give rise to non-trivial problems.
Many applications of temporal logic demand the use of paths, or courses of history. For example, for philosophical purposes it is natural to model the idea that the future is unknown by using tree-like models of time that branch into alternative futures, and in computer science it is standard to reason about unravelings of non-deterministic transition systems. On the face of it, these applications only seem to demand that we work with new classes of tree-like models, and clearly we can do that with the tools we already have. But this is only half the story. As well as new models, we are faced with new expressive demands, and these will lead us to new territory.
For example, in natural language semantics we w ould like t o h a ve a future tense operator F such t h a t F' is true precisely when ' holds somewhere in every possible future (that is, when ' holds at least once on every path through the current state). However we can't de ne F in any o f o u r h ybrid languages even abandoning locality and working with ML+8+A doesn't help. As a second example consider fairness. In computer science applications we may want to insist that a process is activated in nitely often along every possible computation )) see van Benthem (1983) for further discussion. 19 The`straightforward' is justi ed: many of the frame properties required are expressible by pure sentences or schemas, hence completeness will often be automatic. For example, #x v ]G#y@x:F y regulates the interaction of < and v (here v] means \at all super-intervals").
As a second example, we h a ve already noted that atomicity (which w e m a y w ant f o r v) i s enforceable using a pure sentence (see Footnote 15) . It would be interesting to compare an #-and @-based treatment with Yde Venema's two-dimensional analysis (see Venema (1990) ). 20 Of course, one might w ant to distinguish between various types of intervals, such a s o p e n and closed, but we w on't do so here. 21 Readers familiar with the representation theorems for abstract interval structures in terms of point-based structures proved in van Benthem (1983) will (rightly) suspect that in many cases this structured-set approach t o h ybrid interval logic will turn out to be equivalent t o the additional-relations approach. Incidentally, this`duality' between the additional-relations and the structured-set approaches may be relevant for paths too. path but our state symbols won't help us de ne a fairness operator. Thus we have a genuine expressivity shortcoming on our hands. Let's try to x it by hybridization. 22 The basic strategy for dealing with paths in hybrid languages should be clear. First we add a third sort, the sort of path symbols (presumably we w ant to keep the state symbols, though this of course is optional). As with state symbols, path symbols should be divided into two subcategories, namely path variables (which will be open to binding) and path nominals (which will not). So we choose PVAR to be a countably in nite set of path variables (whose elements we t ypically write as and 0 ) a n d P N O M t o b e a c o u n tably in nite set of path nominals (whose elements we typically write as and 0 ), and of course we choose these sets to be disjoint from each other and from PROP, SVAR, and NOM. We de ne the set of atoms of our enriched language to be PROP SVAR NOM PVAR PNOM.
The second step is to add a binder. We shall add a binder called + , t h us forming the language ML+#+ @ + + . As the notation is meant to suggest, + is a u n i v ersal quanti er over paths through the current state (that is,`local paths'). The w s of this language are de ned in the expected way, as are such concepts as free and bound path variables, so let's proceed straight to the semantics.
We shall work with strictly partially ordered trees (S R), and adopt Bull's de nition of a path: a path in (S R) is a linearly ordered subset of S that is maximal among the linearly ordered subsets of S. That is, paths are convex subsets of S that contain the root node and are closed under R-successorship. We denote the set of paths in (S R) b y ( S R). If 2 (S R) and s 2 then we s a y that passes through s. Obviously (S R) i s n e v er empty, and at least one path passes through every state.
De nition 15 (Standard models and assignments) Let ML + # + @ + + be a hybrid language built over PROP, SVAR, NOM, PVAR and PNOM. A model M for this language is a triple (S R V ) such that (S R) is a strictly partially ordered tree, and V : P R OP NOM PNOM ;! Pow(S). A model is called standard i for all nominals i 2 NOM, V (i) is a singleton subset of S, and for all path nominals 2 PNOM, V ( ) 2 (S R).
An assignment on M is a mapping g : SVAR PVAR ;! Pow(S). An assignment is called standard i for all state variables x 2 SVAR, g(x) is a singleton subset of S, and for all path variables 2 PNOM, V ( ) 2 (S R). That is, + is a universal quanti er over local paths the dual binder # ' is an existential quanti er over local paths.
It is easy to see that sentences of this language are preserved under generated submodels. Moreover, the expressivity has clearly been boosted. For example, we can now de ne the F operator:
It is also straightforward to de ne a fairness operator:
At any state s in a standard model, Fair(') is true at a state s i ' is true in nitely often along every path through s.
Moreover, familiar-looking principles of hybrid reasoning extend to our new binder. For example, the rule of path variable localization (if ' is provable then so is + ', for any path variable ) preserves validity, and all instances of the following three schemas are valid:
Local-Path # (Here and p are used as metavariables across path variables and path symbols respectively. In Q1, must not be free in ' a n d i n Q2, p must be substitutable for in '.) In short, the basic quanti cational powers of + described by Q1{Q3
are analogous to those of #, a n d Local-Path is analogous to the validity #xx.
Moreover, we h a ve a Barcan analog: 23 Barcan + 2' ! 2+ ' The contraposed and dualised form 3# ' ! # 3' is perhaps easier to grasp.
Essentially this says: \if we can select a suitable path at a successor state, then we can select a suitable path at the current state" it is a path existence principle.
Our language also supports schemas that re ect path geometry (we u s e p as a metavariable over path symbols and s and t as metavariable over state nominals):
Clearly P1 re ects convexity, P2 re ects R-maximality under successorship, and P3 re ects linearity note the way the state and path symbols cooperate here. Summing up, in many w ays ML + # + @ + + is a pleasant language.
That's the good part | let's turn to the bad. It seems that proving completeness results for + will require new ideas the labeled model method used in the previous section does not automatically give us completeness results for the new binder, or at least, not with respect to the standard semantics de ned above. What's the problem? It's simple, but deadly: although the labeled model construction will guarantee that all states are labeled, we don't have a n y guarantee that all paths will be labeled by some path symbol. 24 This is not easy to x. What are we to do? Robert Bull makes an interesting remark. He comments (see his Footnote 5 on page 292) that although not every path is the interpretation of some path symbol, his model:
. . . d o es provide enough paths V(u) to give a reasonable interpretation. With this remark, Bull hints at a line of work that has subsequently become common in path-based temporal logic. All reasonably expressive path-based logics we know of (for example, Ockhamist logic or CTL ) face similar difculties regarding completeness. A standard response to the problem is to prove completeness with respect to some suitably liberalized notion of model, for example models containing`bundles' of paths (see Zanardo (1996) ) such approaches have a nities with the use of generalized models in second-order logic, or general frames in modal logic. We believe i t w ould be interesting to explore this landscape using hybrid path languages, and suspect that the labeled model construction may be useful in such i n vestigations.
But what of the standard semantics de ned above? This may call for a more brutal line of approach: the use of in nitary rules. Intuitively what is needed is an in nitary extension of the Local-Path schema. From Local-Path we can deduce that there is a path through the current state what we also need is a principle that ensures that given a sequence of states (one of which is the current state) that satis es the convexity, R-maximality, and linearity principles, then there is a path nominal that is true at all the states in this sequence. In nitary rules are unpalatable | but a clean in nitary approach may provide a framework which can (at least, in some cases of interest) be suitably nitized however we m ust admit that at present w e don't know h o w realistic the prospects of success here are.
And that's a taste of the joys and sorrows of hybrid path languages. We h a ve only scratched the surface of a vast topic, but we h o p e w e h a ve said enough to indicate why w e nd this terrain worthy of further exploration. Moreover, we hope we have given the reader a taste of the variety of options hybridization o ers to the study of rich temporal ontologies.
Concluding remarks
We have a r g u e d that the hybridization technique introduced by Arthur Prior and developed by Robert Bull and the So a School is a natural tool for temporal logic. Our argument had both a technical and conceptual side.
Our technical results showed that hybridization is compatible with a temporally natural locality assumption, namely that temporal operators and binders should only be able to work with temporally accessible states. We s h o wed that ML+#+@, a local language in which Until was de nable, had an elegant minimal logic and that many temporally interesting extended completeness results could be obtained automatically. In our view, this language meets the three criteria listed at the end of Section 2 in particular, we feel it exhibits a genuine synergy of modal and classical ideas.
It's only fair to warn the reader that we pay a price for this synergy: H # @](K) lacks the nite model and is undecidable, and the same is true of the logic of strict partial orders. 25 Of course, the logics of many i n teresting frame classes are decidable (for example, the logics of various classes of trees c a n b e p r o ved decidable using Rabin-style arguments see Blackburn and Seligman (1998)), nonetheless the fact remains that binding variables to states tilts the underlying computational properties rmly in the classical direction.
But we believe this is a price worth paying. Labeled deductive systems (Fitting (1983) , Gabbay (1992) ) have proved an important technique for automating modal inference | but labels are usually regarded as a convenient ( i f somewhat ad-hoc) metalinguistic tool. Labels are far more important than that indeed, if Prior is right, they are fundamental to the entire modal enterprise. Hybrid languages internalize the notion of label in the object language, and this internalization can be motivated on grounds that are completely independent of the desire for deductive felicity. Nonetheless, as the use of the Paste-1 rule already indicates (see Footnote 11) deductive felicity i s t h e r e f o r t h e taking: Seligman (1997) discusses natural deduction and sequent-based methods for global hybrid languages containing both 8 and @, and Blackburn and Seligman (1998a) shows that these methods can be adapted even to weak (decidable) languages that contain no binders at all. In our view the deductive and conceptual clarity o e r e d b y i n ternalized labels is more than ample compensation for the undecidability results just noted.
Our main conceptual argument i n f a vor of hybridization is essentially a secular version of Prior's vision of abstract entities as propositions. That is, we f e e l that regardless of whether there is an interesting metaphysical sense in which arbitrary information types should be thought of propositionally, freely combining di erent sorts of information in one modal algebra is a natural way o f modeling temporal reasoning over rich o n tologies.
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